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COUNTY HOME RULE: ST. CLAIR, DUPAGE AND
WILL COUNTIES HAVE OPENED THE DOOR TO
ITS POWERS AND SHOULD WELCOME ITS
ARRIVAL
Home rule is like sex-when it is good it is very, very, good, and
when it's bad it's still pretty good.

John G.
Convention.'

Woods,

delegate,

Illinois

1970

Constitutional

On November 8, 1988, Will County residents elected a chief executive officer called a County Executive. 2 However, despite the fact
that the Illinois Constitution grants home rule powers to counties
with an elected chief executive officer,8 the Will County Board has
not exercised such powers. Moreover, in St. Clair and DuPage counties, there are county board chairmen who are elected at-large, and
who are performing the duties of chief executive officers," yet
neither of those counties has exercised home rule powers. By exercising their home rule powers, these counties could provide their citizens with updated road systems, adequate waste disposal facilities,
efficient administration of human services, effective law enforcement
and other necessary services. Home rule powers allow counties to
develop creative methods of financing and service delivery without
being required to seek legislative approval.
This article will prove that the Illinois Constitution automatically grants home rule powers to counties which elect a chief executive officer. It will show that a county may elect a chief executive
officer under either of two Illinois public acts. This article will argue
1. Anderson & Lousin, From Bone Gap to Chicago: A History Of The Local
Government Article of the 1970 Constitution, 9 J. MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 697
(1976). The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention was made up of 495 delegates
elected to membership in the Convention from across the state. Id. at 706. One of the
delegates was John G. Woods, a former mayor of Arlington Heights. Id. at 745. As a
member of the Convention's Local Government Committee, Wood's role was to present the committee's majority report on home rule constitutional provisions to the
Convention. Id. Woods' remark is representative of the strong support that many
delegates gave the concept of home rule. Banovetz & Kelty, Home Rule in Illinois:
Image and Reality, 1987 monograph, Ill. Issues 4. More than 70 percent of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention signed proposals advocating home rule powers. Id.
2. Andreoli, Government: Can. "County Executive" Give Suburbs the Power to
Manage Economic Growth?, 3 CHI. ENTERPRISE 12 (Sept. 1988).
3.
4.

ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970).

See infra App. A.
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that the County Executive Act unconstitutionally allows voters to

exclude home rule powers when choosing a chief executive officer. It
will show that under this act, a county board chairman who is
elected at-large can acquire the powers of a chief executive officer by
county board ordinance. Finally, this article will suggest that, because Will, St. Clair and DuPage counties now have chief executive
officers, the political leaders in each county should acknowledge that
they have received an automatic grant of home rule powers. However, recognizing that the public equates home rule power with the
power to raise taxes and that such a perception could have political
repercussions, the article also cautions political leaders not to act
precipitously. Rather, they should educate their citizens about the
virtues of county home rule before exercising its powers.
The concept of home rule arrived in Illinois with the adoption
of the 1970 constitution.5 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Con-Con) believed that local governments, facing increased
demands for services due to the urbanization of society, should not
need to seek state help to solve local problems, but instead should
have the power to act through local legislation. 6 Constitutional home
rule powers achieve this by allowing local government to exercise
any power that the state has not denied it.7 Without home rule, a
local government cannot act unless the state has expressly granted it
the power to act.' The delegates to Con-Con also believed that gen5.

MACK, Home Rule Referenda in Illinois, in HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS: FINAL

REPORT, BACKGROUND PAPERS AND SPEECHES, ASSEMBLY ON HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS 61

(S. Cole & S. Gove eds. 1973).
6. COMM. ON LOCAL Gov'T, COMM. REPORT, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 51 (1970) [hereinafter COMM. REPORT]. The committee noted that urban areas throughout the country were faced with demands for many public services including education, welfare, transportation and health. Id. (quoting Sperling, Municipal
Income Taxation and Home Rule, 1 URBAN LAWYER 281 (1969)). The committee also
noted that without home rule power, counties couldn't raise the revenue to meet
these demands. Id.
7. Banovetz & Kelty, supra note 1, at 5. Illinois' home rule provisions follow the
American Municipal Association model in which home rule units may exercise powers
that state law does not specifically deny them. Cole, Illinois Home Rule in Historical
Perspective, in HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS: FINAL REPORT, BACKGROUND PAPERS AND
SPEECHES, supra note 5, at 15-16. Under this model, the state legislature must take
specific action to prohibit local action. See Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill.2d 544, 550, 338
N.E.2d 6, 11 (1975) (where no indication that state statute intended to limit or deny
home rule powers there is no restrictive effect (quoting Rozner v. Korshak, 55 Ill. 2d
430, 435, 303 N.E.2d 389, 391 (1973))), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976). The constitutional provision is a broad grant which allows home rule units to exercise any power
and perform any function pertaining to its government and its affairs. ILL. CONST. art.
VII, § 6(a) (1970).
8. 1. J. DILLON, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911). Municipalities can exercise only those powers that the state expressly granted or those implied in, or incidental to, the powers expressly granted in words, or those essential to
accomplishing the express purposes of the municipalities. Id. The Illinois courts,
since 1970, still apply Dillon's Rule to non-home rule units of government and narrowly assess their powers; in fact, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, has
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eral purpose governments (counties, cities and villages), rather than
single purpose governments (park, library, mosquito abatement and
similar districts), should be the basic service providers because the
latter are duplicative, inefficient and costly to the taxpayer.9 To accomplish this goal, the delegates added to the constitution a provision granting home rule powers to municipalities with a population
of more than 25,000 and to counties with a chief executive officer. 0
Several municipalities met the population requirement and became home rule units when the constitution became effective in
1971." Cook County was the only county in the state which had an
elected chief executive officer in 1970 and, thus, became the only
county home rule unit in the state. 2 Since that time, several municipalities, having reached the population requirement, have begun to
exercise their home rule powers.'" The counties which have elected
chief executive officers, however, have neither acknowledged nor
used their home rule powers.
held in two instances that the 1970 constitution, in effect, codified Dillon's Rule. In
re Estate of Lake Fork Special Drainage Dist., 137 Ill. App. 3d 473, 478, 484 N.E.2d
507, 511 (1985); Buffalo, Dawson, Mechanicsburg Sewer Comm'n. v. Boggs, 128 Ill.
App. 3d 688, 690, 470 N.E. 2d 649, 651 (1984), aff'd 109 Ill.2d 397, 488 N.E.2d 248
(1985).
9. COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 32.
10. ILL. CONST. art.VII, § 6(a) (1970).
11. COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at App. G. More than 50 cities and villages
had populations of more than 25,000 at the time the constitution was being considered by the delegates. Id. By January 1972, after the voters approved the constitution, close to 60 cities and villages were qualified. 11 ILLINOIS POLITICAL REP. 5 (R. T.
Lockhart ed. 1972). In 1973, 66 municipalities met the population requirement and
qualified for the automatic constitutional grant of home rule. Mack, supra note 5, at
61. Municipalities have assumed the automatic nature of the constitutional grant of
home rule powers without question. L. ANCEL & S. DIAMOND, ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL
HANDBOOK,

(1988-1989 ed.)

12. Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, Verbatim
Transcripts 3303 (1970) [hereinafter Transcripts]. Much of the delegates' discussion
at the Convention dealt with the particular problems of Cook County. Id. The delegates carefully dissected the county home rule provision to ensure that, as the largest
county in the state, Cook county would be able to attain home rule powers without
the need to change the status quo or to seek voter approval through referendum. Id.
at 3230-3247. The delegates adopted a constitutional provision identifying the president of the Cook County board as the chief executive officer of the county. ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § 4(b) (1970). The provision requires that the president be elected atlarge, but gives authority to the board to determine by ordinance whether the president should also be elected as a member of the board. Id.
13. In June 1988, Illinois had 108 home rule municipalities. Telephone interview with Larry Frang, Director of Fiscal Programs, Illinois Municipal League (Oct.
18, 1988). Some of the municipalities qualified as home rule units by meeting the
population requirement; others became home rule units through referendum. Id. The
constitution allows municipalities which do not meet the population requirement to
place home rule referenda before the voters. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970). Some
communities which met the automatic population requirement also had to hold a referendum to retain home rule powers because of later population decreases. Telephone
interview with Larry Frang, Director of Fiscal Programs, Illinois Municipal League
(Oct. 18, 1988).
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ANALYSIS OF THE HOME RULE GRANT AND THE SITUATION EXISTING
IN ST. CLAIR, DUPAGE AND WILL COUNTIES

An analysis of the constitution's home rule provision establishes
that it makes an automatic grant of home rule powers whenever a
county meets the requirement of an elected chief executive officer.
Further analysis shows that election of a chief executive officer can
occur through the use of the County Board Reapportionment Act 1 '
("County Board Act") or the County Executive Act,'5 but that in
either case home rule powers automatically accrue. An examination
of the situation in St. Clair, DuPage and Will Counties shows that
these three counties have met the requirement of electing a chief
executive officer and are, therefore, automatically home rule units of
government.
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, V 831 (1987). The provisions of Illinois' County Board
Reapportionment Act ("County Board Act") Id., were written to comply with the

"one man - one vote" decision of the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds v.

Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Prior to this change, counties under the township system
were governed by a board made up of the supervisors of each township in the county.
11 ILL. POLITICAL REP. 4 (January, 1972). The County Board Act requires each county
having less than 3,000,000 in population and operating under the township form of
government to reapportion the county every ten years to create districts each having
an equal number of residents. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, T 833 (1987). The County Board
Act also allows voters to replace the selection of the county board chairman by the
members of the county board with a county-wide election for a board chairman. Id.
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, 701 (1987). The County Executive Act outlines a
form of government which can be adopted by any county in the state of Illinois except Cook County. Id. It provides for the establishment of the county executive form
of government by vote of the electorate on a proposition placed on the ballot by the
county board, or by petition signed by at least two percent of the voters in the
county, or 500 individuals, whichever is less. Id. The Act also includes provisions for
the nomination, term of office, qualifications, duties, powers and salary of a county
chief executive officer. Id. It also states that a county should not elect a county board
chairman after the new government becomes effective. Id.
A 1985 amendment to the County Executive Act allows a county to elect a
county executive with an option to elect not to become a home rule unit. The amendment allows the county to vote on a proposition that states: "Shall the County of...
adopt the county executive form of government and elect not to become a home rule
unit?" Id. at I 705(b). Before it was amended, the County Executive Act automatically combined the adoption of the county executive form of government with the
simultaneous grant of home rule. Id. at 1 705(a). In 1972, DeKalb, DuPage, Fulton,
Kane, Lake, Lee, Peoria, St. Clair and Winnebago counties attempted to change their
form of government by presenting this proposition to the voters. In each instance the
voters rejected the proposition. Banovetz & Kelty, Home Rule in Illinois: Image and
Reality, 1987 monograph, ILL. ISSUES 9. In 1976, Winnebago and Lake counties again
attempted to adopt the county executive form of government, but failed. Id. The vote
against the proposition reflected the public's attitude that county home rule would
result in increased taxes. Mack supra note 5, at 61. Other possible reasons for the
failure of the referenda were a small voter turn-out, Id. at 67-69, general opposition
to the broad powers accorded the county executive, Id., see also Smith, County Home
Rule: Doesn't Anybody Want It?, April 1976 ILL. ISSUES 16, and the opposition of
professional groups who feared home rule licensing powers. Mack, supra note 5, at 45.
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A.

County Home Rule

The Constitutional Grant of County Home Rule is Automatic

In analyzing the constitutional provision pertaining to county
home rule, the following principles of construction are helpful in determining the intent of the drafters: the plain meaning doctrine;
the legislative history; 7 the interpretation of conflicting provisions;",
noscitur a sociis;19 and the meaningfulness of provisions.2 0 The plain
words of the constitution automatically grant home rule powers to
municipalities and counties if they meet certain requirements. The
two categories of governments, counties and municipalities, clearly
and unambiguously "are home rule units" if they meet the constitution's specific qualifications: a population of more than 25,000 residents for municipalities, and a chief executive officer elected by the
electors for counties.2 The plain meaning of the words of the constitution is that upon fulfillment of the single requirement that the
county have an elected chief executive officer, the county becomes a
22
home rule county.
In addition, the legislative history of the county home rule provision clearly identifies election of a chief executive officer as the
triggering event for the grant of home rule powers to counties.2
Mrs. Betty Keegan of Rockford, a member of the Local Government
Committee, stated in the 1970 Con-Con debates that once a county
elected a chief executive officer, the county could begin to exercise
the powers of home rule.2 ' The chairman of the committee also
stated that what the committee intended was to have somebody
elected county-wide who had executive powers before the constitution would grant home rule powers to a county.2 Further, the report
of the Local Government Committee to the convention stated that
the powers granted by this section of the constitution are granted
without action of either the General Assembly or the local govern16. E. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: INTERPRETATION OF LAWS, § 164
(1940). When the language clearly expresses the intent of the legislative body a statute should be interpreted literally. Id. Words should be given their plain meaning. Id.
17. W. ESKRIDGE, JR. & P. FRICKEY, CASES & MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 698-760 (1988). Legislative history includes
the statements of all people involved in the drafting of a statute. Id. Scholars and
judges give great weight to statements by sponsors of the statute and committee reports because they view them as authoritative legislative history. Id. at 709, 735.
18. E. CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at § 166.
19. Id. at § 190.
20. W. ESKRIDGE, JR. & P. FRICKEY, supra note 17, at 576.
21. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970).
22. If the phrase "A [Clounty which has a chief executive officer elected by the
electors of the county . . . " is separated from the remainder of the constitutional
provision, it becomes "A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the
electors of the county [is] a home rule unit." ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970).
23. Transcripts, supra note 12, at 3303.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3243.
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ments which receive the home rule powers.2 6 Finally, the committee
7
report specifically refers to the grant of home rule as "automatic".
The canon of noscitur a sociisss declares that associated words
are to be considered of the same class and should be interpreted
similarly. When the two elements of the home rule provision pertaining to municipalities and counties are considered together, they
29
are mutually dependent upon the phrase "are home rule units".
They are associated words. "A County" and "any municipality" are
of the same class and, therefore, both automatically become home
rule units after meeting their respective qualifying requirement.
Similarly, under the doctrine of conflicting provision," two elements
in the same provision should be construed to be harmonious and not
in conflict. Counties and municipalities are linked together by the
word "and" in the provision and no differentiation is made between
the two elements.3 ' Because the provision pertaining to municipalities is properly interpreted to make an automatic grant of powers,
the provision pertaining to counties should also be interpreted to
mean an automatic grant of powers 82 so that the two elements of
this provision do not conflict.
Finally, it is also a canon of construction that legislative provisions are not to be interpreted to make the actions of the legislative
body meaningless.ss Bcause the Illinois Constitution does not provide any other method for counties to achieve home rule status except by the election of a chief executive officer,"4 if the grant is not
automatic, a county with an elected chief executive officer but not
home rule, would be left with no mechanism for ever obtaining
home rule powers. Interpretation of the county home rule provision
using these canons of construction clearly shows that any county
which has an elected chief executive officer is a home rule unit.
26. COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
27. Id. at 42. The committee explains the limitations on the automatic nature of'
the grant in terms of a municipality's population and a county's election of chief
executive officer as policy determinations needed to ensure that governments which
receive home rule would use the powers effectively. Id. at 54-63
28. E. CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at § 190. Under the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis, when words are associated by a connecting word, such as the word "and", they
are to be presumed to be of the same class unless the contrary is indicted. Id.
29. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970).

30. E. CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at § 166. Each part of a statute should be
reconciled to avoid conflict. No word should be made meaningless by an interpretation. Id.
31. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970).
32. L. ANCEL & S. DIAMOND, ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL HANDBOOK (1988-1989 ed.).
33. W. ESKRIDGE, JR. & P. FRICKEY, supra note 17, at 576.
34. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (1970). The provision, as it appears in the constitution, gives only municipalities the power to become home rule units by referendum.
Id. There is no provision for counties to become home rule units other than by electing a chief executive officer. Id.
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There is no need for either enabling legislation or voter approval.
Once a county satisfies the only constitutional condition precedent
to home rule status, the grant is automatic.
B. Election of a Chief Executive Officer Under Either the
County Board Act or the County Executive Act Creates Home
Rule Powers Automatically
Cook County received an automatic grant of home rule powers
because its county board president is elected in an at-large, countywide election, and is Cook County's chief executive officer. 35 Other
counties can meet this same criteria by electing a chief executive
officer at-large under the County Board Act,3 6 and granting that officer executive powers by rule and ordinance.3 7 The Local Government Committee report expressly recognized that the County Board
Act could lead to county home rule when it noted that eighty-three
counties would be able to elect a board chairman at-large after the
new constitution became effective in 1971.8
Counties may also use the County Executive Act to elect a chief
executive officer.3 " A vote rejecting the county executive form of government under this Act, however, does not prohibit a county from
attaining home rule status by electing a county board chairman atlarge and granting executive powers to the office. In passing the
County Executive Act as enabling legislation for counties to elect
chief executive officers, the legislature created the mistaken impression that a county must seek referendum approval to become a
home rule unit.4 There is no such requirement in the constitution.
The legislature next compounded its error by unconstitutionally
amending the County Executive Act to allow voters to elect a chief
executive officer and, at the same time, to deny the county home
rule powers."1 This amendment directly contradicts the automatic
35.

Transcripts, supra note 12, at 3303.

36. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 34, V 837 (1987).

37. See supra App. A for a description of the powers and duties which are held
by chief executive officers by statute and the powers and duties which are accorded
by rule and ordinance to county board chairmen elected at-large. See infra note 48
for cases in which the duties of a chief executive officer were found in resolution or
ordinance.
38. COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 60-61.
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, V 705(a) (1987). The wording of the referendum with
the words "Shall the County of... become a Home Rule County... " preceding the
words "and establish the county executive form of government?", Id., falsely implies
that the voter is electing to choose home rule. In reality the voter is choosing a form
of government which supplies the county with a chief executive officer thereby qualifying the county for the automatic grant of home rule powers. ILL. CONST. art. VII §
6(a) (1970).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34,
702 (1987).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34 V 705(b) (1987).
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grant provision of the constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional. To examine how the automatic constitutional grant of home
rule powers works, it is helpful to examine the current situation in
St. Clair, DuPage and Will counties.
C. St. Clair and DuPage Counties
In the early 1980s, both St. Clair and DuPage counties used the
County Board Act to elect non-county board members as chairmen
of their county boards in at-large, county-wide elections."2 The
county boards of each county gave their powers and duties by either
rule or ordinance.4 8 The powers extended to the board created chairmen with executive authority who are chief executive officers within
the meaning of the constitution.
The Illinois legislature's definition of a chief executive officer is
found in the list of powers and duties the statutes accord to three
designated chief executive officers: the mayor of a city;44 the presi-

dent of the Cook County board;45 and the county executive described in the County Executive Act.'

Appendix A compares the

duties and powers of these statutory chief executive officers to the
42. In 1974, St. Clair county elected a county board member as its county board
chairman in an at-large election. Telephone interview with Cathy Haas, St Clair
County Board Secretary (Aug 16, 1988). In 1978, DuPage County also held a county-

wide election and elected a county board member as its county board chairman. Interview with Barbra Dragstrem, Secretary to DuPage County Board Chairman Jack
T. Knuepfer, in Wheaton, Il. (Oct 13, 1988). When the County Board Act was
amended to allow it, both counties elected non-board member county board chairman
in at-large elections. Id. In 1972, both counties had unsuccessfully attempted to adopt
the county executive form of government under the County Executive Act through
voter referenda. BANOVETZ & KELTY, supra note 1, at 9.
43. See infra App. A for a listing of the powers and duties given to the county
board chairmen of St. Clair and DuPage Counties.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 11 3-4-4 (1987). The listed functions and duties of a
mayor include the removal of officers, release of prisoners, examination of records,
calling out inhabitants and militia, designation of persons to sign instruments, delivery of messages to the city council, voting to break a tie, vetoing actions of the city
council and, in cities with a population of 500,000 or over, supervising the preparation
of a budget. Id. at 11 3-11-1, 3-11-8.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, 906 (1987). The powers and duties of the Cook
County president, who was acknowledged as a chief executive officer by the' constitution, ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 4(b), also help define the term. The president of the Cook
County Board has statutory power to make appointments to many government offices, to supervise the administration of the government, to preside over board meetings, to veto actions of the board, to prepare a budget and to vote as a board member.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, 1 906 (1987).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, V709 (1987). The duties of a county executive elected
under the County Executive Act include the power to see that all orders, resolutions
and regulations of the board are faithfully executed, to make appointments with advise and consent of the board, to co-ordinate and direct all the administrative and
management functions of the government, to prepare the county's budget, to preside
at board meetings, to approve or veto ordinances, to appoint legal counsel, to enter
into intergovernmental agreements and to call special meetings of the board. Id.
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duties and powers of the county board chairmen of St. Clair and
DuPage counties as determined by county board ordinances and
rules.
As Appendix A indicates, the duties and powers which the statutory chief executive officers have in common are appointment powers, veto powers, and the duty to preside over meetings of the
county board or the city council. Mayors of cities with 500,000 or
more in population also share with elected county executives, and
the president of the Cook County board, the duty to prepare and
administer the annual governmental budget. Although the county
board chairmen of both DuPage and St. Clair counties have broad
appointment powers, preside over the meetings of the county board,
have budget responsibilities, and share other duties which are held
by statutory chief executive officers, neither have veto power. The
DuPage and St. Clair County board chairmen have therefore acquired all of the aspects of a chief executive officer except the power
to veto actions of the board.
The Illinois courts' view of the definition of a chief executive
officer is outlined in several cases which discuss a chief executive's
appointment powers, his responsibility for financial management,
his duty to implement board policies, and his responsibility for oversight and management of the operations of the private corporation
or unit of government which he leads.4 7 In none of the cases has the
court mentioned veto power as a characteristic of a chief executive
officer. 8 The St. Clair and DuPage county board chairmen thus
have all the powers and duties which the courts attribute to chief
executive officers.4" The courts also hold that the powers and duties
47. Village of Round Lake Beach v. Brenner, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1, 436 N.E.2d
1058 (1982) (court recognized that duties of police chief acting as chief executive officer include implementation of village board policies); Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill. 2d
47, 360 N.E.2d 360 (1976) (duties of state school superintendent include overseeing
state school aid funding matters); Dumke v. Anderson, 44 Ill. App. 3d 626, 358
N.E.2d 344 (1976) (village president has appointive powers which include power to
remove appointee from office at his pleasure). In Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box
Co., 20 Ill. 2d 209, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960) the court listed the duties and powers of a
chief executive officer in private industry as the duty to preside over meetings of the
board of directors, the power of appointment and removal of employees, the duty to
manage and control the business of the corporation, the duty to see that the policies
of the Board are carried into effect, and the duty to supervise the direction of the
other officers of the corporation.
48. Id. But see American Surety Co. v. Jones, 384 Ill. 222, 51 N.E.2d 122 (1943)
(powers of issuing certificates and licenses by the director of the State Department of
Insurance, who is an executive officer, were final and not reviewable by the courts).
But concluding that veto power is a necessary ingredient in the definition of a chief
executive officer by an analogy to the insurance officer's licensing decisions is strained
reasoning, at best.
49. See infra App. A, which shows that the St. Clair and DuPage county board
chairmen have appointive powers, responsibility for financial management, the duty
to implement board policies, and the responsibility for oversight and management of
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of a chief executive officer are conferred by statute, ordinance or
board action.5 0 St. Clair and DuPage counties have county board
chairman with executive powers bestowed by ordinances and board
action; therefore, the two board chairman are chief executive
officers.
In addition to the chairmen's lack of veto power, one could also
argue that the St. Clair and DuPage chairmen are not chief executive officers because the establishment of chief executive officers by
county board rule or ordinance conflicts with the 1970 constitution's
requirement that counties and municipalities "adopt, alter or repeal" their forms of government only by referendum. 5 However,
while it is true that courts will not uphold changes in the form of
county government without referendum,5

2

St. Clair and DuPage

counties have retained their status as counties under the township
form of government.55 They have not changed their form of governtheir unit of government.
50. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 209, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960)
(executive powers found in resolution of board of directors); City of East St. Louis v.
Giblin, 3 Ill. App. 219 (1878) (executive powers found in statute or ordinance).
51. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §§ 6(f), 7(2) (1970).
52. Dunne v. County of Cook, 123 Ill. App. 3d 468, 462 N.E. 2d 970 (1984) aff'd
108 Ill.2d 161, 483 N.E.2d 13 (1985). The court held that an attempt made by the
Cook County Board to change the majority vote required to override the chief executive officer's veto, amounted to a change in the form of government because it
changed the historic relationship between the chief executive officer and the legislative branch of government. Id. at 475, 462 N.E.2d at 975. Relying on prior case law,
the court determined that an attempt by the legislative body to diminish the powers
of the executive was a change in the form of government. Id. The court referred to an
interference with the "balance of historic tensions connecting the legislative and executive branches of county government," as the determining factor in whether a change
in the form of government was proposed. Id.
This case is not analogous to the situation in St. Clair and DuPage counties because in granting executive powers to their elected at-large county board chairmen,
the St. Clair and DuPage county boards did not change the historic and traditional
relationship between the two powers. Id. Although a clear separation of powers exists
in federal and state government, most counties in Illinois have not had such a division. Elfstrom and Smith, County Government in transition, ILL. ISSUEs 306 (Oct.
1975). The county board in township counties, administers the offices under its control (such as planning, zoning, public works, animal control and human services), by
directly supervising departments through county board committees; in addition, the
county board sets policy for these offices. Id. at 307. The board also supervises the
budgets of elected officials such as the sheriff, clerk, coroner, treasurer, state's attorney, etc., who serve in executive capacities in their own offices. Id. This control of the
purse strings impacts upon the setting of policy and the administration of these offices. Id. Therefore, for offices both under its direct control and for other county offices, the same body, the county board, carries out both the policy-making, or legislative, function of the government and the administrative, or executive, function. Id.
53. In Illinois, counties operate under either the township or the commission
form of government. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 34,
302, 801-806, 851-857 (1987). The statutes allow for the corporate powers of a county not organized under the township
form of government to be exercised by a board of county commissioners commissioned by the governor of the state. Id. at 302. Until 1972 the county board in township counties was made up of the supervisors of each township. In 1972 the County
Board Act required reapportionment under the "one man-one vote" rule and each
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ment; DuPage and St. Clair Counties have merely allotted duties to
their county board chairmen in the traditionally recognized pattern
of separation of powers.
D. Will County
In Will County, the voters have changed their form of government by referendum.5 4 This gives rise to the issue of whether it is
constitutional to elect a chief executive officer while denying the
county home rule powers. Because the constitutional grant of home
rule powers is automatic, Will County voters created a situation that
violates the state constitution when they elected a chief executive
officer while denying the county home rule powers." When the election was challenged, the circuit court found the phrasing of the ballot question to be constitutional; however, that decision was not
appealed."
The amendment, nevertheless, is clearly unconstitutional becounty had to be divided into the districts from which county board members are
now elected. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, 833 (1987).
54. The Naperville Sun, Sept. 26, 1988, 7A. The proposition was approved by
722 votes out of 49,000 cast. Andreoli, supra note 2, at 12.
55. See Andreoli, supra note 2, at 12. On Nov. 8, 1988, Will County voters chose
Democrat Charles Adelman as the first county executive in Illinois. Id. The Democrats hoping to elect a Democratic county executive in the wake of corruption charges
against the Republican dominated county government supported the change in the
form of government. Id.
56. Bingle & Cleary v. Will County, Chicago Tribune, July 19, 1988 at 1, col. 2
(12th Cir. June 4, 1988) (No. 88-283). The proposition which was presented to the
voters asked, "Shall the County of Will adopt the county executive form of government and elect not to become a home rule unit?" Id. The trial court concluded that
the proposition was phrased legally. Id. The plaintiffs, a Republican township assessor and the publisher of a local newspaper, maintained that voters who supported
home rule but opposed the county executive form of government were disenfranchised because of the phrasing of the ballot question. Plaintiff's Complaint at 3,
Bingle & Cleary v. Will County, Chicago Tribune, July 19, 1988, at 2, col. 2 (12th Cir.
June 4, 1988) (No. 88-283). The plaintiffs claimed that the voters were presented with
two separate, independent and unrelated questions combined in one proposition. Id.
They further asserted that this action was unconstitutional. Id. The court held that
the legislature intended to give counties the opportunity to choose the county executive form of government without becoming home rule units. Bingle & Cleary v. Will
County, Chicago Tribune, July 19, 1988, at 2, col. 2. Judge Herman Haase declared
that should the issues in the proposition be separated, counties which wanted to
choose a county executive form of government, but which did not wish to have home
rule powers, would have to hold a separate referendum after the executive had taken
office to rid themselves of home rule. Id. Judge Haase explained that allowing a
county to have home rule authority granted by referendum for a short time and then
rescinding it by referendum would create chaos in government. Id. This ruling is incorrect because the constitution automatically grants home rule status to counties
when they meet the stated qualifications. See supra notes 22-45 and accompanying
text. The constitution allows the recision of home rule powers only when they are
attained by referendum. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(b) (1970). There is no provision in
the constitution permitting counties to obtain home rule powers by referendum. See
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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cause if it were not, Will County could never achieve home rule status. There is simply no provision in the constitution which allows a
county to adopt home rule by referendum. Only the election of a
chief executive officer triggers this grant. If Will County has an
elected chief executive officer, but does not automatically have home
rule powers, there is no way in which the county can obtain those
powers. The plain meaning, and the legislative history of the constitutional provision, demonstrate that the county home rule grant is
automatic. The amendment to the County Executive Act frustrates
the purpose of this constitutional provision and therefore is
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION

St. Clair, DuPage and Will counties have automatic constitutional home rule powers because they have elected chief executive
officers. When the voters of the entire state adopted the 1970 constitution, they adopted a provision with an automatic grant of home
rule powers. Local voter rejection cannot change that constitutional
grant. St. Clair and DuPage Counties therefore have these powers
even though their voters once rejected a proposition asking if the
county should become a home rule county and adopt a county executive form of government." Will County has these powers even
though its voters attempted to adopt the county executive form of
government without home rule powers." This creates an opportunity for these and other counties to both solve their regional
problems and to finance the solutions.5 9 Therefore, in the interests
of their constituents, political leaders in these counties should work
57.

Banovetz & Kelty, supra note 1, at 9 and supra note 21 and accompanying

text.
58. Chicago Tribune, July 19, 1988 at 1, col. 2.
59. Illinois counties continue to be looked upon as the logical general purpose
governments to assume the role of provider of urban services to their residents. Elfstrom & Smith, supra note 52, at 306. Whether the demands involve human services
for the residents of East St. Louis, in St. Clair county, or Joliet, in Will county, or for
solutions to solid waste disposal in the more affluent DuPage county, there is a need
both for home-grown solutions and for a source of revenue to fund the solutions.
Elfstron & Smith, supra note 52, at 306. See also Andreoli, supra note 2, at 12. Although the demographics of the St. Clair, DuPage and Will counties are different, all
three are facing these demands.
St. Clair - DuPage - Will
Population: 267,531 658,858 324,460
Median Household Income: $16,119 $27,509 $23,329
% of Population Below Poverty Level: 17.03% 3.03% 6.26%
% of Population to Complete Four Years of College: 11.5% 29.0% 14.3%
St. Clair County Intergovernmental Grants Dept., Demographic Information (1980);
Will County Development Dept., Will County Demographic Profile (1980); DuPage
County Development Dept., Profile: DuPage County Statistical Handbook (1980).
Telephone interview with Bonnie Moore, Southwestern Illinois Planning Commission
(Nov. 3, 1988).
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hard to educate their residents about the wisdom of county home
rule. If properly done, this would enable these counties to exercise
their constitutionally granted powers for the benefit of their citizens
with minimal political repercussions to courageous county leaders.
Janet Northrop Petsche

[Vol. 22:763
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